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THE A NTITR US T MARA THON
Part III: The Monopolization/Abuse
Offense: Microsoft as a Case Study
SPENCER WALLER: We have two commentators for this joint
panel, then we'll proceed in this fashion, but I think it makes sense to
talk in an integrated fashion about the remedy side. Standing between
and your lunch is a discussion of to the extent that we have sorted out
today the purpose and role of monopolization law on a conceptual
level, what it means to be a monopolist and what harms it is we are
trying to avoid. We need to get some idea of what it is that
monopolists do and that the dominant firms do that cross the legal
lines in a different jurisdiction. Most of the discussion has been US
and EU centered, and to the extent we can broaden that, we should,
from other jurisdictions. We have two brief issues papers.
One that I put together is looking at whether or not we have, or we
can, develop a single definition of what it means to unlawfully
monopolize or abuse a dominant position. My sense is that we have
failed miserably at doing so and that it's probably an impossible task
to find the Holy Grail. It just hasn't been done yet. People probably
will continue to search, and we should. But at best, we come up with
a framework where the Microsoft court has at least given us a way to
do it, if not an answer as to exactly what should be done in a
particular case. Philip Marsden has done an issue paper where he has
taken the Court of First Instance's Microsoft' ruling and worked
through it, looking at the most recent important pronouncement out
of the European system, and, again, what we do in the shadow of
Microsoft on both sides of the Atlantic.
He has some thoughts about what the court found and what that
suggests about the overall standards for an abuse of a dominant
1 Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v. Comm'n, 2007 WL 2693858 (Sept. 17

2007).
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position. I'll let Philip talk about in the course of the discussion if he
wishes, but I certainly got the sense that the search for a single
standard of what it means to abuse a dominant position is probably as
illusory in the EU as it has been so far in the US system. I think we
all have the responsibility to grapple with what does violate the law
and what should violate the law, and I, therefore, didn't specifically
pick any one person to get the ball rolling. But I invite everybody to
turn their placards up if they wish to speak. I'll go with Ken
Davidson. I gave him the option from having to cut him off the last
time, and I also wanted to thank all the students for hanging in there.
And if there are any questions you have or any comments you want
to offer, we would invite your participation as well.
KEN DAVIDSON: Spencer, thank you. I really want to add a
footnote to your suggestion that maybe we should have a panel on
who gets to decide. Is it the courts, is it the juries? This is not a new
question. This question was debated in Congress after Standard Oil
when they decided they wanted to pass the Federal Trade
Commission Act and when they decided to pass Clayton. They had
very much in mind the kind of debate that we have today about what
is the standard and who should develop it. And what they decided
was fairly simple, that they did not trust the courts. They did not
think the courts were adequate to litigating all of the issues that I
have heard people say repeatedly must be taken into account. We
have to look at consumer choice. We have to look at environmental
policy. We have to look at a whole series of different issues.
Congress passed the Federal Trade Commission Act and said, we
don't think the Supreme Court has shown in StandardOil or the other
cases that they can handle these issues. Well, I submit that the
Supreme Court and other courts in the United States in the last two or
three years have said, we can't make the distinction of what is good
behavior and bad behavior. We can't make the distinctions of who is
an expert and who is not an expert. We don't trust juries to make this
kind of decision. The possibility of false positives is so great, that we
simply will not listen to issues. Well, these are not new issues. These
are issues that went into the creation of the Federal Trade
Commission. We have a specialized commission which has never
reached its potential, which stands there like the European
Commission and could be used for the kinds of purposes that all of
you have suggested have to be brought into antitrust. The courts
have walked away. Maybe we need a new institution. That's my
thought.
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PHILIP MARSDEN: It's a great point to start on, because one of the
things I wanted to clarify about the Court of First Instance judgment
in Microsoft on September 17th is that contrary to a lot of what the
earlier commentators have said about it, this was not a full appeal in
the sense that I think you understand in the United States. This is
something that is much more closely focused on what we call a
judicial review standard. The standard in the case was based on the
fact that the European Commission is responsible for making
complex economic appraisals, and the courts' review is necessarily
limited to checking whether the relevant rules on procedure and
stated reasons have been complied with, whether the facts have been
accurately stated, and whether there has been any manifest error of
assessment or a misuse of powers. And even though the judgment is
extremely thorough and gets into a range of very deep economic
appraisals, the court is saying, we don't think that Microsoft has
shown that the European Commission is manifestly wrong or has
made a manifest error or appraisal. So in that sense, I just want to
point out that this is a very, very well reasoned judgment, but there is
that standard there, which is a lower standard, I believe, than a full
review on the merits.
SPENCER WALLER: You're describing something that's akin in
United States law to a judicial review of an agency decision where
you're looking for abuse of discretion or failure to develop a record
supporting an agency's decision.
PETER CARSTENSEN: I want to come back, in a way, I've been
thinking about standards, to the point that I made earlier about the
difference between the structural focus on monopoly and the conduct
focus. First of all, I think, again, focusing on the American law, the
great error was to combine those two issues under the label
"monopolization." If the courts had separated out conduct and said
that's what an attempt to monopolize means, then we've got a certain
set of rules for that, and monopolization is when we're looking at the
structure of a firm, and we are going to try to terminate or dissipate
its market power, that would have, I think, substantially clarified the
inquiry where in one case, when you're focusing on structure, and
this is what I've always understood in Alcoa was, was it substantial,
was it durable, were the centripetal, centrifugal forces of the market
unable to remedy this, and was there a workable remedy?
Then when I turn to the attempt model, and this is the conduct stuff
that we've been talking about so much, I like the court of appeals
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approach in Microsoft2 of focusing in on the competitive effects of
particular conduct. I think the crucial question is really a step four,
where on the one hand, a plaintiff may say that justification is
pretextual, that is, that there is no justification in terms of efficiency
gains from this conduct. But it's the other prong that interests me and
raises some interesting things and allows me to pick up a moment on
Simon Baker's concerns. That is, as it stands-as I understand step
four, the next alternative for the plaintiff is to say, yes, this is a
justification, but there is a less restrictive, a less anticompetitive
alternative to achieve the same goal, which invites the Court, the
agency, the jury, whomever our decision maker is going to be, to
second-guess a management. And that's what creates, I think, risks.
And contrary to all that I have stood for 40 years as a lawyer and an
academic, I want to suggest that that may not be the right standard,
given the dynamics of markets, etcetera, and that something similar4
3
to what Justice Peckham in the Trans-Missouri and the Joint Traffic
cases, I think, invoke, which is, if there is a business justification, if a
reasonable, non-monopolist could have engaged in this conduct, then
it should be lawful.
Now, I would say that the trade-off is then I want a much more
vigorous review of structure. General Motors finally died 40 years
after it should have been executed. I'm told that Kodak is now dead.
But there was about 60 years when it was alive, kicking, and causing
harm. That is, one needs a more robust willingness to look at where
there has been significant market failure with respect to those
centripetal and centrifugal forces and intervene and restructure
industries so that they have a more competitive structure. If you'd
allow me to do that, which none of you will, then I am much more
prepared to have a much more hands-off view of conduct, because I
think conduct is extremely hard to police and police sensibly in that
kind of day-to-day market. But then you've got to do more when
market structure fails significantly. And the thing that we've lost
sight of, I think, in the American context is we haven't really
preserved that structuralist view of the world, and it died its last gasp,
actually, in the Microsoft case, with a stupid remedy judgment that
the court of appeals killed, not inappropriately, I think, but with the

2 United

States. v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001).

3 United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897).
4 United States v. Joint-Traffic Ass'n 171 U.S. 505 (1898).
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generalization that structural remedies are inappropriate. Complete
reversal of the StandardOil standard.
STEVE CALKINS: Coming from Detroit, I need to begin by
reassuring Peter that General Motors continues to exist, and indeed,
until last year, it was the largest seller of cars and trucks in the world,
thank God, and providing lots of employment and tax revenue for the
great state of Michigan. But your point that you have to decide either
to have an aggressive merger policy and a less aggressive dominant
firm policy, or vice versa, surely is correct, because you need to
address problems here or there. I went back in terms of what's-I
guess the topic here is what's the right standard? And the
modernization commission has identified the ideal writing, that
Section 2 standards should be clear and predictable in application and
administrable.
The area of predatory pricing law provides the best example of
success in achieving these goals. And that's the view, the consensus
view from a very distinguished group in Washington, is that the ideal
is predatory pricing. And I would dissent from that. Yes, predatory
pricing law is very clear. The answer is the defendant always wins,
unless the plaintiff hired Ken Elzinga. It's an easy administrable
standard. You just look and see if Ken is here in the witness box,
then you know how to rule. But that's not ideal.
What that's about is the courts responded to a not-I hate to say this,
not an affection for juries, but a fear of jurors, for a fear about
massive discovery, for a fear about private litigation. For all this,
they recoiled. They were persuaded they're terrible risks of false
positives. And you really get the message that we don't think that we
can, as a court system, make hard decisions. We can't make
carefully tuned judgments, and we need to err on the side of the
defendant, especially in predatory pricing cases, but now we see more
and more in area after area after area of competition law.
And you do occasionally get people sort of echoing Ken Davidson's
point and say, my golly, maybe the answer really is that the courts are
not up to the job. And once you turn to something like a Federal
Trade Commission, which has the unique advantage that a violation
does not create a follow-on right of action and a violation can be
established under Section 5 without proving a violation under Section
1 or Section 2, so a private party can't come along, and it may well
be that there are areas where the Commission ought to identify
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practices that it's prepared to go in and condemn. And that's easy to
say, and it sounds nice, and the problem only is that the Commission
really has never done a great job of accepting that assignment. And
when people talk about interesting or informative guidance from the
courts, Spencer talks about the Microsoft case, which was not a
Federal Trade Commission decision. Some people like some of the
concepts they find back in Aspen Skiing5 , which was not a Federal
Trade Commission decision. It happens that we have a system of law
development that has used the courts. Maybe it's not going to work.
I'm not prepared to give up quite yet.
STEVE SHADOWEN: I just want to emphasize how wide the gulf is
between, for example, the predatory pricing standard and the standard
set forth in the Microsoft en banc decision by the DC Circuit. One of
the things that is sometimes overlooked is that the Microsoft Court
applied the rule of reason balancing test to product design changes
(what defendants like to call "technological innovation"). For
example, the Court applied the balancing test to Microsoft's design of
the add/remove function in its software. The private plaintiffs bar is
now using the Microsoft approach to challenge pharmaceutical
manufacturers' strategy of making minor, non-improving (or even
degrading) changes in their products in order to impair generic
competition. 6 We have recently brought a case in the District of
Columbia challenging what the defendant says is a technological
innovation and what we say was simply a change in the product
design to keep generics from getting FDA approval.
PHILIP MARSDEN: I think quite a lot of European lawyers and
economists read the Court of Appeals decision in Microsoft in the US
with a lot of interest and favored it. They favored the rule of reason
analysis, and I think they were probably hoping for something like
that kind of analysis from the Court of First Instance, in the Microsoft
case in Europe. It was a decision of the full Grand Chamber, 13
judges, and they spent an awful long time on it. I don't believe their
judgment comes through as rule of reason analysis. It follows much
5 Aspen

Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp, 472 U.S. 585 (1985).
6 See Abbott Labs. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 432 F. Supp.2d 408 (D. Del.
2006); see generally H. Hovenkamp, et al., IP AND ANTITRUST, at § 12.5 at 12-45 12-48 (Supp. 2007); Guy Amoresano, Branded Drug Reformulation: The Next
Brandvs. GenericAntitrust Battleground,62 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 249 (2007).
7 See Rite Aid Corp., et al. v. AstraZeneca Pharms. L.P., et al. No. 06-CV2089 RWR (D.D.C.).
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more the traditional type of analysis of how they traditionally find
dominance in Europe In this case though the court makes some
fundamental policy statements, they say. 'We have found dominance
to the extent of ubiquity, and we in Europe choose quality over
ubiquity.' And the judges made several findings of fact, such as that
Microsoft products were not as good as potential products that were
coming out to market and that Microsoft's ubiquity was preventing
the dissemination and development of these products. And the thing
that I was concerned about was that I saw no attempt by the court to
devise limiting principles. They did have an opportunity at one point
to say whether this case was limited only to Microsoft or a super
dominant firm. And they specifically did not say that, so their
statements pertain to the law on abuse of dominance generally. And
then you see the commentators saying this is going to apply to
companies with a 40 percent market share since that is the threshold
of dominance in Europe. But nobody would say that companies with
a 40 percent market share have ubiquity, so those findings at least
can't be generally applicable. So I think that ubiquity is the only
'limiting' principle in this case, and they should have gone further
and developed something more helpful in terms of guidance with
respect to the dividing line between an efficient distribution system
and exclusionary practices. Just grateful for reactions.
MS. ANITA BANICEVIC: My comment is not necessarily a reaction
to Philip's point, but to provide a bit more perspective regarding
where Canada is at on this same issue. I think we're pulled in two
directions. We were just involved in a loyalty rebate case that went to
the Federal Court of Appeal, and the Canadian Commissioner of
Competition put forward a number of arguments that are consistent
with the EU approach to loyalty programs by dominant firms. The
Commissioner's arguments essentially, were that when a loyalty
program is offered by a dominant firm, it's problematic. Her written
arguments cited the approach in Michelin, as well as a number of
other cases in the EU. And we, on behalf of the defense, put forward
arguments that were more in line with the rule of reason approach
and said, look at the US, and look what they've considered in similar
cases. In the end, as a result of the Court of Appeal's decision, we
ended up somewhere lost in the middle of this debate, and in my
opinion, no further off. The Court of Appeal declined to really wade
into the appropriate approach with respect to loyalty programs and
one of the primary points of guidance offered by the Court was that
for the purpose of determining whether a particular course of conduct
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is "anti-competitive", the approach that should be taken is focused on
whether there is any intended negative effect upon a competitor.
Now, in Canada, there are two elements to the abuse of dominance
legislation. First, you have to consider whether or not something is
an anticompetitive act because it's part of our legislation, so that's the
first hurdle. But in my view, the Court of Appeal has potentially set
the bar too low such that anything that's an act of competition that's
directed towards a competitor could potentially me the definition of
an "anti-competitive act." So, for example, dropping your prices
could meet the Court of Appeal's definition of anti-competitive act which is an intended negative effect that is exclusionary, predatory,
or disciplinary towards a competitor. I should mention that in prior
Canadian abuse cases, it was accepted that one needs to look at
effects on competition (and not just a competitor) in order to
determine whether something was an anticompetitive act.
Where we ended up as a result of this case is that the effect on
competition doesn't matter for the purposes of determining whether
something is anti-competitive. The Court of Appeal determined that
an act may be found to be anticompetitive, but then one might find
that it does not meet the second arm of our abuse of dominance
legislation which is to consider whether the impugned act has the
effect of substantially lessening or preventing competition in a
relevant market.
So, in my view, the dichotomy between EU and the US has had an
impact in Canada, where we're sort of at a loss as to which approach
to follow In my view, we have ended up following neither approach,
really, leaving the state of our abuse of dominance law a bit more of a
mess. But we'll see where we end up. The case that I am referring to
is going to be redetermined by the Canadian Competition Tribunal in
February 2008.It will be interesting to see whether or not the Court of
Appeal's standards will actually make a difference in the outcome of
the redetermination.
ADRIAN MAJUMDAR: The difference in starting points in the EU
versus in the States is important to understanding the different views
expressed here. Following Michelin II, the standard for finding abuse
is a practice that is "capable of harm", which is a pretty low standard.
It's not even "likely" or "very likely", it's just "capable of harm". So
when people talk about the risk of false positives in Europe, we're
already starting from a much lower standard relative to the US. And
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also bear in mind that the dominant position, to the extent that one
can appropriately focus on market shares, could start at 40 percent.
Whereas, I guess, it would be a higher starting point here. And if
you're talking about low price abuses, again, as I understand it, in the
US it's much harder to penalize predatory or other exclusionary
pricing than in Europe. In sum, if you're starting point in Europe is
that a 40 percent market share combined with a certain form of
behavior that's capable of harming competition can be an abuse, then
that's a very different starting point to what you have here in the
States. I guess we'll have more discussions about risks of false
positives; I would imagine that the risk must be different here
compared to Europe as a result of the different starting thresholds for
intervention.
STEVE CALKINS: Just to pick up on Philip's point, and actually
now Adrian, in terms of the difference in this nation and Europe of,
relatively, what we would think of as small firms being concerned
about all this or Simon's lament about this firm wanted to have low
prices and it was afraid. In the US, we both have these very clear
pro-defendant standards, and, as Adrian suggested, a much higher
level of power needed or market share needed before you become
concerned. During the dominant firms hearing, Ron Stem for General
Electric spoke up and said, look, counseling in the world of
monopolization in the US simply is not hard. It's very rare that there
are any concerns. He said that, quote, most successful firms simply
do not meet the monopoly power test under US law. It's just not a
hard thing to give advice. The answer is you don't need to worry
about this in the vast majority of circumstances. And it's really a very
different situation than you have in Europe. How can one explain
this? I think the only way you can explain it is by the different
systems of law enforcement.
Here, going back where I was before, because of private litigation,
the courts have been driven to create very clear pro-defendant
standards and to insist on very clear proof of high market shares and
power. In Europe, where you have more trust in government, more
trust in enforcers, you hope that the government will be wise and
restrained, you can have standards that when applied can result in
much greater enforcement. And, of course, one of the interesting
wrinkles will be what happens if private enforcement becomes a
reality in Europe? Will you have to change and become more like
us?
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SPENCER WALLER: You know, Steve, you've alluded to one of
my great fears in the world, which is, I know a lot of reasonable
people have said our substantive rules have been driven by remedies.
We'll get to the guts of that after lunch. My real fear is, we'll end up
in a world where we have extremely loose standards, coupled with
the diminution of private enforcement. We'll get rid of it or further
curtail it and still have the same general pro-defendant rules, even in
a world where there's less private enforcement. And then my
counterfear is that Europe may be ending up with the opposite world,
where they have much more restrictive rules for the behavior of the
defendants and a growing system of private enforcement. So we both
could end up with the worst of all possible worlds, just in opposite
directions.
SIMON BAKER: Just to Steve Calkin's point about having allknowing omniscient governments which we trust and love, we could
take it because the discussion that these are very sophisticated so on,
and they make great decisions when they do. One of the trends that
I've seen, certainly in the UK, and I think more generally, it's selfassessment, however, where they are pushing stuff off and they're
saying, we're not going to opine on this. There is case law, there is
guidance. You decide whether you're dominant. You decide if this is
a problem. So even if we can trust them to make their decisions when
they do, but there's this whole trend about pushing it back onto firms,
their advises and having to read the tea leaves from what's gone
before. And that's where the problem-I think that's the heart of the
problem that I see. If we were getting after the event, wise decision
making and sensible remedies applied for a no-fault basis that would
be fine. It's when we have to second-guess and the businesses are
having to second-guess, that's where these issues really, you know STEVE CALKINS: Can't these expensive lawyers in Europe tell
their clients when the government will care and when the government
won't care?
SIMON BAKER: No, they can't. Because the standard is, as Adrian
was saying, so very low. You can have 35 percent on one measure or
a 15 percent on another. For the reasons you said about cellophane
fallacy, we find it very hard to say, well the market is clearly this or
clearly that. So there are some plausible states of the world where
you might have 35 or 42 percent, but we're not sure, and here's a
discount scheme which looks a bit like Michelin, so on a
precautionary basis, you should not go ahead. And you'll struggle to
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get guidance from the regulatory authorities. They'll say, well, selfassess. And this is where we-and it's not the isolated-you know,
Ron Stem's point. This is firms that almost on an intuitive level, you
would say this firm can't be, you know, seriously a problem. And
there are lots of firms with 35, 40, 45 percent on certain market
definitions, which is great for business but problematic.
ANDRE FIEBIG: I would take issue with the statement or inference
that it is easy in the United State to advise dominant firms. Let's start
with the threshold issue of whether the firm has sufficient market
power in the first place. Defining market, despite being a necessary
step in the process, is inherently imprecise. I merely have to refer to
the recent Whole Foods8 case in which the D.C. District Court denied
the application of the Federal Trade Commission to enjoin the merger
of Whole Foods and Wild Oats. In that case, you had relatively clear
evidence on the anti-competitive purpose of the merger. And yet, the
court disagreed with the relevant market definition advanced by the
Federal Trade Commission. Ambiguity and uncertainty are inherent
characteristics of an antitrust practice. So it is not always fair to
claim that firms know when they are engaging in monopolistic
practice or abusing their dominant position. Even in the Microsoft
case it was not entirely clear. Reasonable minds could differ on the
issues. Moreover, in many instances, cases are decided by juries.
This adds to the uncertainty. Hence, whether a particular commercial
practice is permissible is often a difficult determination.
SPENCER WALLER: Well, Andre, assuming you don't have
problems with definition, and assuming you have an admittedly
dominant firm, what, in general, is it that you say to them when they
say, what can we do and what can't we do?
ANDRE FIEBIG: You mean once you know they're dominant?
SPENCER WALLER: Yes.
ANDRE FIEBIG: But that is my point. The illegality of particular
conduct is often dependent upon market power and hence market
definition. If you assume market power, then the task is much easier.
But in the real world, it is extremely difficult to know whether a firm
enjoys sufficient market power.
8

Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Whole Foods Mkt., Inc., 502 F.Supp.2d I (D.C. Dist.

Aug. 16, 2007).
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SIMON BAKER: It's a hypothetical.
SPENCER WALLER: Well, Microsoft knows.
ANDRE FIEBIG: I am not convinced that was the case.
SPENCER WALLER: They know now.
ANDRE FIEBIG: Perhaps. But even that conclusion may change in
the near future.
SPENCER WALLER: Once you either resolve or assume the
ambiguities, what is it that you tell a firm, if you are dominant,
comma, you may do X or you can't do X? And I guess that's my
question is, is there a single standard? Should it be, well, if you
could do it when you had 15 percent, it's okay. Now you have 75
percent, what do you tell them? Out of a worst-case scenario,
assuming somebody finds you are dominant or a monopoly power,
what can you do and what can't you do?
ANDRE FIEBIG: Well, I think that is a somewhat easier question
than the threshold question of market power.
SPENCER WALLER: What do you tell them?
ANDRE FIEBIG: Well, it depends on the particular conduct at issue
and many other factors. If it were so easy, there would probably be a
lot fewer cases and a lot more unemployed lawyers.
PHILIP MARSDEN: First, Microsoft tying, and then I'd like to talk
about BA. With respect to guidance, what the commission and what
the courts clearly told Microsoft is that you're more than welcome to
continue innovating and adding applications to your operating
system, please continue to do so. And also, don't think you have to
come into the Commission in advance and check with us to see if a
particular new application is all right. However, you do have to make
sure that if you do bundle any application with your operating system
in the future, you have to provide, for the European market, another
product that does not have that bundle of new applications as well.
That's very clear.
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So as long as there is a 'less Improved', or 'degraded' product,
available on European market, then it shouldn't be an abuse for
Microsoft to innovate. With that said, I understand that Microsoft is
probably into the Commission's offices almost daily trying to
negotiate with them about what applications they are or are not
allowed to bundle, and the extent of such product integration. But the
clear position of the law is that you are able to continue innovating,
just make sure that the European consumers have a different less
innovative product to choose from as well.
Now, from the BA case, when Virgin Atlantic made its complaint
against British Airways with respect to the step discounts and fidelity
rebates to travel agents, let's remember that complaint in the US
court was summarily dismissed for not showing any antitrust injury.
But in Europe, the complaint was accepted by the Commission, a
several million Euro fine was levied, and this was affirmed by the
European Court of Justice. The explanation from the European Court
of Justice last spring was that we're not protecting competition as a
'process', we're protecting competition as an 'institution'. The
judgment had a lot more than might be structuralist sort of language
than might be expected even with competition as a process type
theory.
The immediate reaction from the Office of Fair Trading in the UK, which had been critical of the theory of harm espoused by the
Commission - was to close all of the cases it had from complaints
against BA from any other rival relating to such discounts. It was a
real sort of poke in the eye of the European Court. So it was really
quite a moment in England to see this happening. Some practitioners
were completely split, because the OFT was also releasing a paper on
private actions, which was essentially saying, if you can't come to us
to get any joy, use the courts. But if you go to the courts, what case
law are they obliged to use? European Court of the Justice in BA. So
they're clearly transferring the cases to the courts, and if you're going
to see increasing litigation in the UK, as you definitely are, it's going
to be under European case law. So just in terms of balancing the use
of the administrative agency versus the courts, I think it's going to be
quite a shift there in the next few years. I don't think that is going to
help the development of coherent and convergent policy throughout
Europe though; quite the opposite.
MS. ANITA BANICEVIC: Simon picked up most of my comments.
However, I want to address the question that was raised regarding
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how do you know when an enforcement agency's going to care about
a certain course of conduct. In my opinion, our abuse of dominance
legislation is also prone to being used for strategic complaints by
competitors. And that's a factor that makes it difficult to advise
clients as to whether an enforcement agency is going to view a
particular course of conduct as problematic. In my view, the relevant
question is not whether the Competition Bureau will care, but will
your competitors care? Will they care enough to go to the bureau?
And that, to me, is a concern. In addition, another factor which
sometimes arises, and this may be a cynical view, is whether or not
the enforcement agency feels any pressure to bring a case of a
particular nature. A particularly cynical view that has been expressed
in Canada is that the Bureau may have been interested in bringing a
loyalty rebate case in Canada, given what was going on in the EU and
the US. So, overall whether an enforcement agency will take
enforcement action in respect of a particular course of conduct will
often depend upon a number of factors which are beyond the control
of counsel.
MAURICE STUCKE: One thing in the CFI's opinion that surprised
me was the lack of complaints by consumers, as well as the Court's
reliance on the third Mercer 9 survey to show that Microsoft's product
was inferior to that of its rivals. Although the Court placed great
weight on this one survey, it did not seem from the opinion at least,
that customers were forced to take the Microsoft product, and if
consumers had their druthers they would have opted for the other
systems. 10 When I was with the Antitrust Division, one of our
9See, e.g., Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v. Comm'n, 2007 WL 2693858
(Sept. 17 2007) at 407-412, 635, 652, 661.
'0See, e.g., Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v. Comm'n, 2007 WL 2693858
(Sept. 17 2007) at 662 (stating "[n]ext, Microsoft cannot rely on the fact that
consumers never claimed at any time during the administrative procedure that they
had been forced to adopt a Windows work group server operating system as a
consequence of its refusal to disclose interoperability information to its
competitors. In that connection, it is sufficient to point out that Microsoft does not
dispute the Commission's findings at recitals 705 and 706 to the contested decision.
Thus, at recital 705 to the contested decision, the Commission observes that it is
developers of complementary software required to interoperate with Microsoft's
systems who 'depend on the interface information' and that '[c]ustomers will not
always exactly know what is disclosed by Microsoft to other work group operating
system vendors and what is not'. At recital 706 to the contested decision, the
Commission states '[w]hen confronted with a "choice" between putting up with
interoperability problems that render their business processes cumbersome,
inefficient and costly, and embracing a homogeneous Windows solution for their
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mantras was "Are consumers concerned, and, if so, what are their
concerns?" The consumers' concerns do not appear in the Court's
opinion. It also struck me that with respect to media players the
Court, at times, took a paternalistic tone, namely, consumers do not
care because they have Microsoft's Windows Media Player, and thus
will not inquire about alternative media players' Was there
consumer concern or was it basically the complaints of competitors?
PHILIP MARSDEN: That's one of the questions I put at the head of
my paper. And people responded privately and said, you know, it
doesn't really matter whether or not consumers have intervened on
the side of the Commission or not. That doesn't happen much in the
US, with the exception of Bert Foer, maybe. I still think it's a valid
point to make, though, because Microsoft was the most high-profile
competition case in Europe, absolutely. And the main allegation of
harm was consumer harm, based on indirectly reduced choice. And
the reason why I threw that question about why wasn't there more
sort of consumer noise is that consumers are, of course, diffuse and
not very well organized in Europe as well. However, at the same
time, I was conducting the study with DG SANCO, which is the
consumer body at the European Commission, which was a study of
how 14 of the national consumer NGOs were liaising with their
national competition authorities and with the Commission. And I said
to them, let's pick some products that you would like to do a case
study on, based on existing cases. And we gave them a list. And one
of them was the Microsoft case, and they didn't choose that. They
chose petrol, generic medicines, and downloadable music. I said, you
know, this is a great opportunity for you to educate yourselves about
the market and to explain to your members what the Microsoft case is
work group network, customers will tend to opt for the latter proposition' and that
'[o]nce they have standardised on Windows, they are unlikely to report

interoperability problems between their client PCs and the work group servers'.").
" See, e.g., Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v. Comm'n, 2007 WL 2693858
(Sept. 17 2007) at 1041 (stating "'[u]sers who find [Windows Media Player] pre-

installed on their client PCs are indeed in general less likely to use alternative
media players as they already have an application which delivers media streaming

and playback functionality'. The Court therefore considers that, in the absence of
the bundling, consumers wishing to have a streaming media player would be

induced to choose one from among those available on the market."); Case T201/04, Microsoft Corp. v. Comm'n, 2007 WL 2693858 (Sept. 17 2007) at 1053
(stating that "while downloading is in itself a technically inexpensive way of

distributing media players, vendors must deploy major resources to 'overcome endusers' inertia and persuade them to ignore the pre-installation of [Windows Media

Player]"').
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about. And they just didn't want to be involved. They just said it was
just an obvious anticonsumer practice. And I thought, well, in that
case, you should be intervening or speaking up or something. But
they weren't going to do that, nor could they explain to me why
bundling and charging for access to protocols was anticonsumer. So,
no, there was no movement from the consumer NGO side to
intervene. And equally, there was no reaching out from the
Commission to consumer NGOs. So the Microsoft case is definitely a
competitor-driven complaint and I don't mean that pejoratively: most
abuse cases are. I mean, the competitors are mainly five large
American software companies, and that's a fact. They can be called a
federation or whatever it is, but they're definitely companies, not
consumers. So it's just something that very much puzzled me, that
there wasn't more consumer body involvement. And reaching out
from the Commission down to the consumers in a way and saying
come on in. Bring in some surveys, bring in some complaints, maybe
they're just not organized. Maybe that will change as litigation
increases.
JEFFERY CROSS: I want to respond to Spencer's question, because
I think that's the nub of the issue-at least in the US. Assuming clear
dominance, although in the US it would be phrased "monopoly," and
you have defined the market properly, and have the market shares to
assume monopoly, the real question has been: What can the
defendant do and what it cannot do. The reason I think that is true in
the US, is that we don't condemn monopoly itself because of the fear
of hurting innovation and application of business acumen. What we
condemn is the improper attaining of monopoly or improper
maintaining of monopoly.
Of course, the question becomes what is improper. It's easy at one
end of continuum, when the defendant is cutting crab lines and
beating up crew members of competitor's boats, which is the Dooley
v. Crab Boat Owners case. 12 As you walk down the continuum,
where do you end up? I always liked the tension between the Alcoa
case and the DuPont Titanium Dioxide case. In Alcoa, if I remember
correctly, Alcoa was building new plants to meet competition, and
Judge Learned Hand concluded that such conduct was over the line.
In the DuPont13 case, DuPont was building new plants, highly
12

Dooley v. Crab Boat Owners Ass'n, 2004-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) P74,42 1.

13

In re E.I. du Pont de Nemours (T:

02 ),

96 F.T.C. 653 (1980).
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efficient plants to meet demand, but that was considered to be
acceptable. So I think the answer to your question necessarily is
moving towards the kind of burden shifting approach that you outline
in your paper, and I think that's not a bad one. If the defendant comes
up with a plausible pro-competitive justification for the conduct,
plausible from the perspective of advancing consumer welfare and
efficiencies, etcetera, etcetera, then the burden goes to the plaintiff to
show that the overall effect is an anti-competitive effect versus a procompetitive effect, all of which are very susceptible to a jury
analysis, both of what's plausible and not plausible.
I also want to comment on something that Peter said in terms of the
least restrictive means test, in the context of burden shifting and the
defense of the plausible pro-competitive justification. The conduct
may advance consumer welfare, but in reality, it's more than you
need to accomplish the same means. And is that just second-guessing
management? I think of Judge Taft's analysis of least restrictive
meaning in Addyston Pipe, which was whether conduct that goes
beyond what is necessary, at least for the portion that goes beyond
what is necessary, is that really anti-competitive. I think the foregoing
fits nicely into a burden-shifting framework with once you come
forward with a plausible pro-competitive justification for your
conduct, I'm not blowing up the trucks, but I'm trying to compete as
a monopolist and to innovate. Then the plaintiff suggests, well, it's
more than you need. And then you ultimately get to the test of
what's the ultimate anti-competitive effect in the market place.

